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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 78-22(3)0) of the Utah Code.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25
An action may be brought within four years:
(1)
upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing;...
(2)
for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Plaintiffs and Appellees in this action are owners of five-acre lots in the
Rocky Top Subdivision in Erda, Tooele County, Utah. With one exception, the Plaintiffs
purchased their lots from the Defendants and Appellants, Edward Clayton Warr and
Hazel Warr (the "Warrs").1 The Warrs had advertised the availability of the lots through

1

Plaintiffs Wayne D. Lewis and Miriam Lewis purchased their property in 1997
from Howard A. Crittenden and Lora Lee Crittenden Trial Exh. 119. The Crittendens
purchased the property from the Warrs. (Trial Exh. 34). The Lewises have received a quit
470081vl

1

newspaper advertisements and signs announcing the availability of "five-acre ranchettes,
water, utilities . . . " Trial Exh. 60. In their sales pitch to Plaintiffs, the Warrs represented
that, with the purchase of each lot, water sufficient to irrigate five acres would be
provided and delivered to the Subdivision from the Rose Spring, in which the Warrs had
an ownership interest. A pipeline from the spring to the Subdivision was already in
place, but was in poor repair.
Although the deeds to the lots did not convey the water rights, the Warrs
repeatedly acknowledged their obligation to provide the water and deliver it to the
Subdivision, and assured the Plaintiffs that they would do so as soon as it became
possible.2 However, various problems (discussed more fully below), prevented the
Warrs from delivering the water for a number of years after the lots were sold. Id. See
alsoR. 954 at 103.
In reliance on the Warrs' representations, the Plaintiffs purchased the lots, built
family homes on them, and made valuable improvements to the land. In addition,
several Plaintiffs participated, bothfinanciallyand physically, in the installation of a
distribution pipeline to deliver the water to their respective lots. They did so with the

claim deed from the Crittendens, entitling them to all of the Crittendens' "right, title, and
interest in any and all water or water rights associated with" Lot 10 of the Rocky Top
Subdivision. Trial Exh. 131.
2

Indeed, Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds was reassured by the Warrs at the closing on his
property that, notwithstanding the content of the deed, the water would be conveyed and
delivered as soon as certain obstacles were resolved. R. 954 at 50.
47008W1
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understanding that they already owned the rights to the water. Thereafter, however,
instead of conveying or providing the water as represented, the Warrs approached certain
Plaintiffs in late 1995, offering to sell them quit claim deeds to the water rights for
$2,500-$5,000. Plaintiffs, knowing that they had already purchased the water, refused to
pay the additional money. To date, the Warrs have failed to deliver the waterfromRose
Spring as promised, or to convey the water rights, leaving the Plaintiffs with no choice
but to seek judicial relief.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action on January 28, 1999. R. 1-41. The
Warrs filed a motion to dismiss based on arguments under the statute offraudsand
statute of limitations. The motion was denied. The Warrs later moved for summary
judgment under the same theories. That motion was also denied. R. 72-96, 197-98,233449, 583. The matter was tried to the Honorable David S. Young on March 13-15,2000.
In their Trial Brief and at the beginning of the trial, the Warrs moved to exclude all
evidence that contradicted the terms of the written deeds to the lots. They did so only on
the basis of the parol evidence rule.3 Judge Young denied that motion. R. 953 at 7. At

3

The Warrs have indicated that they moved to exclude such evidence at the beginning
of trial under the doctrine of merger and the parol evidence rule. Appellant's Brief at 5. The
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the record shows that the motion was based only on the
parol evidence rule. R. 953 at 6-7. The Warrs9 trial brief never mentioned the doctrine of
merger, nor did the pretrial order. Moreover, the transcript pages the Warrs cite state only
the following on the issue:

470081vl
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the conclusion of trial, the court found for Plaintiffs and against the Warrs, and ordered
that the Warrs convey to the Plaintiffs sufficient water to irrigate their properties as
established by the evidence. R. 955 at 146-150. Plaintiffs, as directed by the court,
prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. R. 918-937. The
Defendants objected to the proposed Judgment on the basis that the Judgment required
the Warrs to convey an excessive amount of water, but their objections were denied by
Judge Young, who signed the Judgmenton April 24, 2000. R. 854-913, 916-37. The
Warrs thereafter filed this appeal.

MS. DRAGOO:

Your Honor, we had one other preliminary matter.

THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. DRAGOO:

That involves the basis. The case in chief is based on oral
evidence, and the best evidence in the record right now are
warranty deeds. And under the parol evidence rule, before the
court can consider the parol evidence that would be in the case
in chief of the plaintiff, you must make a finding that the
warranty deeds were not in integration of the parties; and
secondly, that the warranty deeds are somehow ambiguous.
And so we would continue to make that objection.

THE COURT:

That objection may be reserved for the record. I don't have any
objection to having that a continuing objection throughout the
course of the trial. I think it's going to be important for me to
hear, and I have had preliminary motions that have caused me
to believe I needed to hear the witnesses.

MS. DRAGOO:

Thank you, your Honor.

R. 963 at 6-7.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts were established by the evidence at trial, in the record, and by
stipulation of the parties:4
1.

In or about 1983, the Warrs purchased from Terracor approximately 110

acres of real property, located in Tooele County, which property was subsequently
subdivided into five-acre residential lots, known collectively as the Rocky Top
Subdivision (the "Subdivision"). Trial Exh. 1,2,11,17.
2.

In conjunction with the acquisition of this real property, the Warrs also

acquired from Terracor a 40% interest in rights in certain water originating at a spring
located approximately one mile from the Subdivision, known as "Rose Spring" or
"Bryan Springs." Id. There was an existing pipeline that ranfromthe spring to the
Subdivision. R. 809.
3.

To facilitate this development, on October 11, 1983, the Warrs filed with

the Office of the Utah State Engineer (the "State Engineer") an application to change the
place of use of the Water (1.0 cubic foot per second) to the Subdivision. Trial Exh. 3.
4.

On November 2, 1984, the State Engineer approved Change Application

No. 1-12993, thereby approving the use of the water for the irrigation of the Subdivision.
Trial Exh. 7. The Warrs were given until October 31,1988 to put the water to beneficial
use. See Id.

4

As discussed in more detail below, the Warrs' statement of facts is taken almost
entirelyfromthe uncontested facts in the pretrial order which, of course, does not reflect the
evidence determinative of the contested facts. Defendants have, therefore, utterly failed to
marshall the evidence as is required.

5.

In November, 1984, the Warrs presented their proposal for developing the

Rocky Top Subdivision to the Tooele County Planning Commission. Trial Exh. 11. In
their presentation, the Warrs indicated that they intended to use the water for irrigation of
the proposed Subdivision. Trial Exh. 13.
6.

Thereafter, the Warrs commenced the advertisement and sale of five-acre

lots in the Subdivision. Certain newspaper advertising announced the sale of "five-acre
ranchettes, water, utilities . . . " Trial Exh. 60.
7.

The Warrs sold some of the lots to their children. In 1985, the Warrs

conveyed Lots 4 and 5 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their daughters and sons-in-law,
James and Brenda Baldwin and Cecil and Teresa Jones, respectively. The Warranty
Deeds that conveyed Lots 4 and 5 did not convey water rights. Trial Exh. 18,19. In
1986, the Warrs conveyed Lot 3 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their son, Howard
Warr, and his wife, Linda Warr. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 3 did not convey
water rights. Trial Exh. 29. In 1988, the Warrs conveyed Lot 7 of the Rocky Top
Subdivision to their daughter, Cathy Warr Johnson. The Warranty Deed that conveyed
Lot 7 did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 16. Finally, in 1991, the Warrs conveyed
Lot 11 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their son, Edward Kyler Warr and his wife, Lisa
G. Warr. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 11 did not mention water rights. Trial
Exh. 68.
8.

The Warrs verbally represented to Plaintiffs that, although they would need

to obtain a permit to drill a well for culinary water, rights to water sufficient to irrigate

4*7nnfii*/i
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five acres would be included in the purchase of the lots, and that this water would be
delivered from the Rose Spring to the Subdivision through an existing pipeline by
gravitational flow. R. 661; R. 953 at 42-43, 76, 91, 132-134, 157-158, 173-175, 195196; R. 954 at 6-9, 18,29-30,46-47. In addition, the Warrs pointed out the Rose Spring
to the buyers. R. 953 at 91.
9.

Commencing in January, 1986 the Plaintiffs purchased five-acre lots in the

Subdivision from the Warrs.5 Trial Exh. 24, 34,43, 54, 56, 62, 75. In each case, the
Plaintiffs (or with regard to the Lewises' claims, the prior lot owners, the Crittendens)
were informed by the Warrs that the purchase price of the lot included rights to sufficient
water, delivered, to irrigate their five-acre lots. R. 953 at 42-43, 76, 91, 132-134, 157158, 173-175, 195-196; R. 954 at 6-9, 18, 29-30,46-47.
10.

In their dealings with Melvin and Sandra Spears, who purchased Lot 6 of

the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1986, the Warrs stated that sufficient water to irrigate five
acres would be provided and delivered as part of the purchase price of Lot 6. R. 934; R.
953 at 42, 76. The Warrs further indicated that the water would be delivered through the
existing railroad pipeline to the Subdivision, and that a pipeline would need to be
installed to deliver the water to the individual lots. R. 953 at 43. At the time that the
Spears purchased the lot, the back of the lot was green and highly saturated, with
irrigation water running on the lot. R. 953 at 44. The Spears drilled a culinary well and
built their home on Lot 6. R. 953 at 49, 52. The culinary well provides water sufficient
5

Plaintiffs Wayne D. Lewis and Merriam Lewis purchased their lot in 1997fromthe
original purchasers, Howard A. Crittenden and Lora Lee Crittenden. Trial Exh. 119.
470081vl
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for their domestic needs and the irrigation of one quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 51. R.
934. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 6 to the Spears did not mention water rights.
Trial Exh. 21.
11.

In their dealings with Howard and Loralee Crittenden, who purchased Lot

10 of the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1987, the Warrs represented that sufficient irrigation
water to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose Spring, and
that the water was included in the price of the lot. R. 954 at 28-30. In addition, Clayton
Warr showed Mr. Crittenden flowing water on the back of the lot. R. 954 at 29. The
Crittendens drilled a culinary well and moved a mobile home onto Lot 10, where they
lived until they sold the property to Wayne and Miriam Lewis in 1997. R. 954 at 19.
The culinary well provided sufficient water for their domestic purposes, some stock
watering, and the inrigation of one quarter acre of land. R. 671-672. The Warranty Deed
that conveyed Lot 10 to the Crittendens did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 34.
12.

In their dealings with Wayne Reynolds, who purchased Lot 2 of the Rocky

Top Subdivision in 1988, the Warrs represented that with the purchase of the lot,
sufficient water to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose
Spring. R. 954 at 45-47. The Warrs further stated that the water would be delivered to
the Subdivision through the existing railroad pipeline, but that a pipeline would have to
be installed to bring the water across Lot 2. R. 954 at 45-47. The Warranty Deed that
conveyed Lot 2 to Mr. Reynolds did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 43. At the
closing on Lot 2, Hazel Warr informed him that, because of problems with Max

8

Bleazard, the Warrs could not convey and deliver the irrigation water at that time, but
that eventually the water would be provided. R. 954 at 50.
13.

After acquiring Lot 2, Mr. Reynolds did not immediately drill a culinary

well, due tofinancialconstraints. R. 954 at 55. In or around 1995, the State Engineer
imposed a moratorium on new appropriations of water in the Erda area. R. 954 at 56-57.
Mr. Reynolds was therefore prevented from drilling a culinary well on Lot 2. Id. With
neither culinary nor irrigation water, Mr. Reynolds has been unable to use or sell his
property. R. 954 at 55.
14.

In their dealings with Clifford and Tonja Ruben, who purchased Lot 9 of

the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1990, the Warrs represented that sufficient water to
irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered with the purchase of lot. R. 953 at
91. At that time, some water was already being delivered to the lot by a pipelinefromthe
Rose Spring. R. 953 at 92. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 9 did not mention
water rights. Trial Exh. 56. The Rubens drilled a culinary well and built a home on Lot
9. R. 953 at 98, 100. With their culinary well, the Rubens are able to do some stock
watering and irrigate one quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 99.
15.

In their dealings with Fred and Karen Martinez, who purchased Lot 1 of

the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1990, the Warrs represented that, with the purchase price
of the lot, water sufficient to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the
Rose Spring. R. 953 at 195. The Warrs stated that the water would be delivered to the
Subdivision through the existing railroad pipeline, and that a line would be installed to

47008W1
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bring the water across the Lots. R. 953 at 195-196. The Warranty Deed that conveyed
Lot 1 did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 62 The Martinezes built their home on
Lot 1. R. 954 at 13. With their culinary well, the Martinezes are able to irrigate one
quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 204.
16.

In their dealings with Gary and Heidi Jo Thomas, who purchased Lot 8 of

the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1992, the Warrs represented that sufficient water to
irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose Spring as part of the
purchase price of the lot, R. 953 at 173-174, and that the water would be provided once
the dispute with Bleazard was settled. At the time of purchase, there was water on the
back of Lot 8. Trial Exh. 75. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 8 did not mention
water rights. R. 953 at 180.
17.

The Plaintiffs and the Crittendens purchased their lots with the intent of

irrigating them. Fred and Karen Martinez wanted to grow alfalfa. R. 954 at 7. Clifford
and Tonja Ruben also wanted to grow alfalfa. R. 756. Heidi Thomas had horses and
wanted to grow hay. R. 953 at 169, 181. Wayne Reynolds planned to raise game birds
on the property. R. 954 at 55. He knew he needed water. Id.
18.

In the purchase of their lots, the Plaintiffs relied upon the Warrs'

representations regarding the irrigation water. Every Plaintiff, as well as the Crittendens,
testified that they would not have purchased the property absent the Warrs'
representations regarding irrigation water. R. 953 at 46, 53-55, 79, 94,119,184,199200, 206; R. 954 14, 18, 30, 51-52, 55-56.
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19.

Representations and promises regarding the water were made, not just by

Clayton Warr, but by Hazel Warr as well. R. 953 at 79-80, 195-196; R. 954 at 6-9,27,
45-46, 50. Loralee Critten testified that the Warrs acted as "more or less equal partners."
R.954at27.
20.

In April, 1987 the Warrs were sued in the Third Judicial District Court of

Tooele County, State of Utah, Civil No. 87-058 in an action challenging their ownership
of the water. In defense of this claim, the Warrs filed an affidavit signed by both of them
under oath. Trial Exh. 40. In relevant part, the affidavit states:
WefiledApplication No. a-12993 (15-3020) with the Utah State Engineer to
change the point of diversion, place and nature of use of our 40% interest in
Diligence Claims 1260 to facilitate the use of such water for irrigation, domestic,
and stock watering uses on our property and on the Rocky Top Subdivision.

We subdivided and platted elevenfive-acreparcels of our property within Section
26, Township 2 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, Tooele
County, Utah as the Rocky Top Subdivision, recorded August 30, 1985 at Book
232, Page 344, official records of the Tooele County Recorder.
We subdivided and platted the Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of selling
platted lots with water developed from our interest in the Rose Spring, in reliance
on the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision of November 2, 1984.
We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rocky Top Subdivision upon our
representation that gravity flow Water would be provided to such lotsfromour
interest in the Rose Spring.
Due to the pending quiet title action concerning the Rose Spring filed by Dale
Max Bleazard, J.N. Ward Engineering has been unable to construct the planned
metering and diversion system for the Rose Spring and we have been unable to
provide gravity flow Water through such facilities to the Rocky Top Subdivision.

Id. When questioned about the affidavit at trial, Hazel Warr explained, "I suppose Pm
perjured." R. 954 at 95.
21.

At the time that the Plaintiffs purchased their lots and repeatedly thereafter,

the Warrs informed them that delivery of the water was being held up by the adverse
claims to the water by Mr. Bleazard. R. 953 at 53, 101, 181, 202; R. 954 at 50. Certain
of the Plaintiffs were also informed that certain improvements to the pipeline from the
Rose Spring to the Subdivision had to be made in order to increase the flow of water for
use by the lot owners. R. 953 at 53; R. 954 at 46-47. Later, they were assured that
"Loveless is working on the deeds, and things should be taken care of really soon." R.
953 at 183.
22-

As noted above, the lot owners along the south side of the Subdivision

were also told that a distribution line from the point at which the line from the spring
entered the Subdivision to their lots would have to be installed. R. 954 at 46.
23-

On June 17, 1988 the Warrs, through their attorney, Denise A. Dragoo,

filed a written application with the State Engineer, signed under oath, seeking an
extension of the time for filing proof of beneficial use of the water from October 31,
1988 to October 31, 1991. Trial Exh. 38. This extension was approved by the State
Engineer. This application referenced the Warrs9 efforts to perform certain tasks
necessary to deliver the water from the Rose Spring to the Subdivision. Trial Exh. 37.
24.

In June of 1990, the Bleazard litigation against the Warrs was dismissed

without prejudice. Trial Exh. 59. Thereafter, Bleazard continued to fight with the

19

Warrs over the use of the Rose Spring water, threatening further legal action until
approximately 1993 or 1994. R. 954 at 115.
25.

In the summer of 1991, the Warrs began the installation of a pipeline to

distribute water from the railroad pipeline to the lots along the southern boundary of the
Subdivision. R. 953 at 53-54, 199.
26.

In reliance on the promises made by the Warrs, Wayne Reynolds, the

Spears, and the Martinezes participated in the cost and physical installation of the water
distribution line from the northeast comer of the Subdivision where the existing pipeline
from the Rose Spring enters the Subdivision to their respective lots. R. 953 at 53-55,
199-200; R. 954 at 51-52. After this pipeline was installed, the amount of water
deliverable to the Subdivision remained very limited by the capacity of the railroad
pipeline. R. 668, 928.
27.

On October 24, 1991, the Warrs filed and signed under oath a request for

an additional extension of time for the filing of proof of beneficial use of the water from
October 31, 1991 to October 31, 1993. Trial Exh. 71. In this request, the Warrs offered
the following reason for an extension: "Work in progress on waterline. Work still to be
done. I have spent approximately $6,000 on waterlines and will spend $4,000 more
before completed." Id. A substantial portion of these funds were supplied by Plaintiffs.
R. 953 at 53-55, 199-200; R. 954 at 51-52, 142-143. This request for an extension was
granted, and the Warrs were given until October 31,1994 to put the water to beneficial
use. Id.

28.

In 1993, Mr. Bleazard finally agreed to allow the Warrs to transfer the

water rights into the Plaintiffs9 wells. R. 954 at 103; R. 667. The Warrs, however,
continued to provide excuses for their failure to convey the water rights and deliver the
water. R. 953 at 53, 101, 173-175, 181, 202.
29.

On July 12, 1994 the Warrs, without additional compensation, conveyed by

quit-claim deed to their son Howard and his wife, who owned one of the lots in the
Subdivision, rights to seven and one-half percent (7.5.%) of their interest in the Water for
the purpose of irrigating their son's five-acre lot. Trial Exh. 98; R. 954 at 145-146.
Similar quit-claim deeds were given to the Warrs' other children who resided in the
Subdivision, also without additional compensation.6 Trial Exh. 97; R. 954 at 145-146.
30.

On September 12, 1994, the Warrs filed a request with the State Engineer

for another extension of time for filing proof of beneficial use of the water from October
31, 1994 to October 31, 1996. Trial Exh. 100. In support of this request, the Warrs
stated as follows: "Working on Water Line. Increase Water flow from 30 gallon minute
to 60 gallon minute, which would be my 25 percent of Water Right." Id. This statement
was in writing and signed under oath. The Warrs9 request for an extension was granted
by the State Engineer. Id.
31.

At various times after purchasing their lots, Plaintiffs inquired as to why

the water had not been delivered, and were repeatedly told that the water was tied up
6

Although Hazel Warr admitted at trial that her children who purchased lots in the
Subdivision were told they would have irrigation water, the warranty deeds conveying the
properties to her children are, like those given to the Plaintiffs, silent on the subject of
irrigation water. R. 954 at 72; Trial Exh. 18, 19,29.
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because of Bleazard, or that the Warrs were working on the pipeline, or that the deeds
were being prepared. R. 953 at 53, 58, 101, 181-182, 202. At all times prior to 1995, the
Warrs continued to assure Plaintiffs that they would provide the water as soon as
possible. R. 953 at 62, 181-182.
32.

In or about 1995, the Warrs told their son, Howard Warr, that they had

decided they were not going to convey to the Plaintiffs the promised water rights without
the payment of additional money. R. 953 at 146. When Howard protested that the
Plaintiffs had already paid for the water rights, the Warrs did not deny that the original
deals had included water rights, and delivery of the water. Instead, as Howard testified:
his father's comeback in all of it was 'they have nothing in writing", R. 953 at 151, and
his mother's was "bring on the lawyers." R. 953 at 156.
33.

Thereafter, the Warrs began informing the Plaintiffs that quit-claim deeds

had been prepared to convey the water rights as originally agreed. R. 953 at 59-61, 101102, 183, 204-206; R. 954 at 18-19, 53-54. However, the Warrs now stated, for the first
time, that the Plaintiffs would have to pay an additional $2,500-$5,000 per lot for the
water rights, stating that they "had to make some money on this." Id.
34.

The first set of quit claim deeds Mr. Loveless prepared at the Warrs'

instruction, in the names of Plaintiffs and the Warrs' children, would have conveyed
"Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of [the Warrs' water right], which represents .079
cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs." Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88.
(A subsequent set of deeds was later prepared, cutting the amount of water to "Seven and
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one half percent (7.5%) of [the Warrs' water right]... which equals a flow of .075 cfs in
Rose Spring." Trial Exh. 90, 92, 97, 98.)
35.

Every Plaintiff who was approached (the Rubens were never approached

by the Warrs, but learned from Heidi Thomas that the Warrs were attempting to sell the
deeds for $2500), as well as the Crittendens, refused to pay for the deeds, saying that they
had already paid for the water rights with the purchase of their lots. R. 953 at 59-61,
101-102,183, 204-206; R. 954 at 18-19, 53-54.
36.

When Clayton Warr approached Howard Crittenden about purchasing the

quit claim deed, he offered to take Mr. Crittenden's horse trailer in lieu of the $2500.
The Crittendens were unable to sell the horse trailer to the Warrs because they had
already sold it to their daughter. Loralee Crittenden testified that her daughter purchased
the horse trailer in 1995. R. 954 at 18-19.
37.

When Hazel Warr informed Heidi Thomas that the water would cost

$2500, Heidi responded, "I'm a single Mom. I can't come up with $2500. What am I
going to do?" R. 953 at 183. She hung up and called Tonja Ruben. Id. Ms. Thomas
placed this conversation in October of 1995. R. 953 at 182. When asked how she knew
the date, Ms. Thomas replied that it was after her husband, Gary, had moved out in
August of 1995. R. 953 at 182.
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38.

Fred Martinez was living in his home at the Rocky Top Subdivision when

he received a phone call from Clayton Warr offering to sell him the quit claim deed to the
water rights for $5,000. Fred said "No way" and hung up the phone. Mr. Warr called
back later and said the price would be $2500. Again, Fred refused. R. 953 at 204-206.
Karen Martinez testified that they moved into their home at the Rocky Top Subdivision
in November of 1995. R. 954 at 12.
39.

Wayne Reynolds, Melvin Spears, and Sandy Spears all testified that the

Warrs first told them that they were going to have pay an additional $2500 for the quit
claim deeds in 1995. R. 953 at 59-60, 78; R. 954 at 53.
40.

When the Plantiffs protested that they had already paid for the water rights,

the Warrs responded by telling them "You don't have anything in writing" and "bring on
the lawyers". R. 953 at 183. The Warrs refused to deliver the deeds.7
41.

On September 4, 1996 the Warrs filed with the State Engineer a request for

yet another extension of time to prove the beneficial use of the water from October 31,
1996 to November, 1998. Trial Exh. 111. In support of this request, the Warrs
represented the following, again in writing and under oath:
We are in the process of upgrading the "source" water line in order to use
100 percent of water rights. We need additional time to accomplish
upgrading the source line (currently 4") to a new 12" line. The line is

7

The deeds were actually prepared, and some were signed by the Warrs. Trial Exh.
80-83, 86, 90, 92. (Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at "A").
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estimated to be approximately one mile in length requiring upgrade. The
"place of use" water lines have been developed.
Id. This request for an extension was granted by the State Engineer. Id.
42.

In 1997, Howard and Loralee Crittenden sold Lot 10 of the Rocky Top

Subdivision, together with the mobile home thereon, to Wayne and Miriam Lewis. Trial
Exh. 119. The Crittendens made clear that they were not selling irrigation water with the
property. Trial Exh. 115. However, their listing agent, Vonna Warr, told the Lewises
that they could purchase irrigation water sufficient to irrigate five acres from the Warrs
for a one-time fee of $2500. R. 954 at 33. Mr. Lewis did not immediately purchase the
water rights, because he lacked the money to do so. R. 954 at 37. He later learned that
the Crittendens had purchased irrigation water with their purchase of Lot 10, but that it
had not been delivered. R. 954 at 40. Accordingly, he did not purchase the irrigation
water from the Warrs, but joined in this action. R. 954 at 40. In December of 1999, the
Crittendens conveyed to the Lewises, by quit claim deed, any and all water rights which
they had in association with Lot 10 of the Rocky Top Subdivision. Trial Exh. 131.
43.

In September 1998, the Warrs filed an additional Request for

Reinstatement and Extension of Time, seeking to extend the time for proving beneficial
use of the water until October, 2002. Trial Exh. 124.
44.

After the Warrs began trying to sell the quit claim deeds to the Plaintiffs,

Howard Warr had a conversation with his father, Clayton Warr, regarding the irrigation
water, in which he told his father "You can't be double selling this water." R. 953 at
47008W1
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151 Iloward testified: "I was arguing with him, asking him what his word was worth to
him

and I was asking m> dad v\ lliiiil1 n 11 was his word and telling him you couldn't
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To date, the Warrs have failed and refused either to convey to the Plaintiffs

llicii all"! 11,..Ill i nr I . uMtipkk: the delivery systei. ;;.. •* llic Uose Spring to the \\.-. I y
Top Subdivision.
46
M

\ I lrial, the Warrs' expert witness, Mr, Vein Loveless, testified that .079

i ^ uie amour* ^f water the State Engineer's office requires for the irrigation >r H ;
i

die amount ui u*

v--ciw^ lurUici icsniicu inat

tiuu water tivv
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can drawfrom,their * nlinnn w«iils I (II"' H .1

I ,' n „ 11 in" i with ,079 cfs, would allow the in igation of five acres of land. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
i preponderance of the evidence"
presented, that the Plaintiffs were entitled to the irritfnliun wain llicy soil

U <>SS .nil

146. In so concluding, the court properly held that the doctrines of merger, the parol
evidence rule, the statute offrauds,and the statute of limitations did not preclude such a
irsnh

I In (ioctiiiif ill merger n nmpimi, iinni in liii. nhi nrcuusu IIIC panics intended

that the Wans' performance would not be complete upon the execution of a wnmml v
deed Rather, all parties intended, as represented, that the Warrs would convey to them
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and deliver the water to the Subdivision at some point after the warranty deeds to the lots
were provided. In addition, as the Waits are quick to point out, the warranty deeds do
not reference irrigation water. The water does not pertain to the same subject as does the
deed. Thus, the doctrine of merger does not apply.
Moreover, the trial court did not err in determining that the parol evidence rule did
not bar Plaintiffs' evidence or claims. On the question of whether a contract constituted
a complete integration of the parties' understanding, all relevant evidence is admissible.
The court did not err in allowing such evidence for that purpose. The trial court
expressly found, as required, that the warranty deeds were not integrated. Having made
that determination, it was not improper for the court to find, based upon the evidence, in
favor of Plaintiffs. Further, the Warrs failed to marshal the evidence on whether the
deeds constituted an integration of the parties' understanding, and thus have not
adequately challenged the trial court's finding.
The trial court also properly held that the statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiffs'
claims, due to the doctrine of part performance. In addition to acts of part performance
by the Plaintiffs, the court cited "strong independent evidence" of the oral contracts,
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of exclusive referability. The statute of frauds
should not be made the means of perpetrating a fraud or gross injustice. In this case, as
the court found, the compelling evidence demonstrates that application of the statute of
frauds as a bar to Plaintiffs' claims would work just such a result. Again, the Warrs
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larshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings as to acts of part •
ng independent evidence ot" llic oral contracts. •
The Warrs' statute o f' 11 n 111 /1111 H i •» < \ i1»11111 < • 111 • 11 s. 11 I 111 • I I i • \ V f u r 11 < I (11 11 i \ mh
and conduct, misled the Plaintiffs into believing that they were trying to peribmi as
agreed1, such thai legal A, (Uin would nnt h? mer"- J ^ z evidence establishes that t u
\\ air i iiliiill mil iiiiinili111 1.1 ilis.i

i\(

>n toproxiuw a ^ ....

until late in 1995. Under such circumauui^c - ft • */

wate-

}

Plaintiffs acted within the statutory time frame once the) became aware of ihci* vauov v,A
action Moreover, again Line W a n s lailed to marshal the evidence supporting the tolling
of the statute, nml I here Ion" lirni not riihn.nl <iii r i d d e n

- .-. i^v lo the trial court's

decision.
Plaintiffs W a y n e and Miriam Lewis are entitled to the relief awarded them. While
(In I x.\\ tscs admittedly did not have a contract with the Warrs, they have a quit d d l
acL..

•

»

> \ ater to winch the

Crittendens were entitled by reason of their contract with the Warrs, I

il i iii il

properly rejected the Warrs' defense of lack of privity.
I MI,I|K

I|II

jiiiiii ii 1 ill w ater awarded lo the I'ldintiils is not excessive. The

evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiffs wnv promised water siiHiueni mi ini^m in 1
acres. The only evidence in the record is that .079 cfs is that amount of water.
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the quit claim deeds the Warrs finally had prepared were to convey that amount to
Plaintiffs. The trial court's decision should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE
OF MERGER.

The Warrs argue at length that the trial court erred by not excluding all evidence
of dealings prior to the execution of the warranty deeds and by not finding that the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of merger.8 Appellant's Brief at 14-17.
8

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs note that the Warrs did not raise the doctrine of
merger in their Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, Trial Brief, or in the
Pretrial Order. R. 68-96,434-449,591-607,643-683,684-709. Moreover, contrary to their
assertion in their brief, they did not raise the doctrine of merger at the commencement of
trial. See, supra at 4-5,fii.3. The Warrs' motion to exclude the evidence of prior dealings
on the first day of trial was made only under the parol evidence rule. While counsel did
object at times during the trial that the oral representations had merged into the deeds, the
"doctrine of merger"' was never specifically mentioned until closing arguments. R. 953 at
34; R. 955 at 118-120. The trial court was presented with no legal authority or detailed
discussion on the doctrine of merger until that point (when counsel referred the court, in
passing, to one case on merger). R. 955 at 118-120. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs
question whether the issue was adequately raised to preserve the issue for appeal. As this
Court has stated,
In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a
party must first raise the issue in the trial court. That is, a trial
court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. A trial
court has the opportunity to rule on an issue if the following
three requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be raised in a
timely fashion"; (2) "the issue must be specifically raised;" and
(3) a party must introduce "supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority."
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hart
v. Salt Lake County Comm % 945 P.2d 125,130 (Utah App. 1997) (other internal citations
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The doctrine of merger is inapplicable in this case As this Court has stated:
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is
applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer.
Execution and delivery of a deed by the seller then usually
constitute full performance on his part, and his acceptance of
the deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of that
performance even though the estate conveyed may differ
from that promised in the antecedent agreement. Therefore,
in such a case, the deed is the final agreement and all prior
terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and
unenforceable.
However, if the original contract calls for performance by the
seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title, his
obligations with respect thereto survive the deed and are not
extinguished by it. Whether the terms of the contract are
collateral, or are part of the obligation to convey and
therefore unenforceable after delivery of the deed, depends to
a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto.
When the seller's performance is intended by the parties to
take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it
cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties that
delivery of the deed would constitute full performance on the
part of the seller, absent some manifest intent to the contrary

Stubbs v. HemmerU 567 P.2d 168, 169-70 \\ Jf.illl il

11 mphasis mlrinl I,

In Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners, 987 P.2d 3u" (Utah 1999), this
Court iciicraied the foregoing standard for the application of the merger doctrine, and

omitted), plaintiffs question whether the doctrine of merger was specifically raised at any
point prior to closing arguments, as well as whether it was timely raised, in the context of
this case which had been briefed extensively and tried for three days before the doctrine of
merger was mentioned in closing arguments.
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stated that'" covenants related to title and encumbrances are not considered to be
collateral because they relate to the same subject matter as does the deed'" Id. at 35
(quoting Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added)). In this
case, there is no dispute that the warranty deeds make no mention of irrigation water. By
definition, the contracts regarding the water do not "relate to the same subject matter as
[do] the deed[s]." Id.
Applied to the instant case, it is clear that merger is inapplicable to the contracts to
provide and deliver the irrigation water. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the
Warrs and the Plaintiffs intended that the Warrs' delivery of the water to the Subdivision
would take place after the delivery of their deeds. The Warrs told the Plaintiffs that they
would solve the problems with Bleazard and upgrade the pipeline such that the water
could be delivered to the Subdivision. R. 953 at 173, 195; R. 954 at 29,46-47,50. All
parties understood that this would take place after the delivery of the deeds. In the case
of Wayne Reynolds, Hazel Warr made these assurances at the closing on his property. R.
954 at 50. Heidi Thomas was told by Clayton Warr that because of the Bleazard case, he
couldn't deliver the water at the time purchase, but that it would be provided and
delivered thereafter, R. 173. Under such circumstances, "it cannot be said that it was
contemplated by the parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full performance
on the part of the seller

" Dansie, 987 P.2d at 35 (quoting Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567

P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1977)).
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The doctrine of merger simply does not apply

5 contracts to provide and
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all relevant evidence is admissible on the threshold issue of whether the writing was
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adopted by the parties as an integration of their agreement. This appears to be so even if
the writing clearly states it to be a complete an final statement of the parties'
agreement." Id. (emphasis added). See also, Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Brothers
Construction, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266
(Utah 1972). In this case, the trial court could not have determined, without hearing the
evidence, whether or not the deeds were a complete integration of the understanding of
the parties. It was not error to hear the relevant evidence and then make a finding that
the deeds did not constitute a complete integration.
The evidence clearly supports the finding that the parties in this case did not
intend the instruments of conveyance to be a complete integration of their agreements.
Perhaps the best evidence of this is Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds' testimony that, at the
closing on his property, the Warrs assured him that although they could not deed and
deliver the water to him at that time, it would be provided as soon as the Bleazard
litigation was resolved. R. 954 at 50. Likewise, Heidi Thomas testified that Clayton
Warr expressly stated that since the Warrs were still trying to resolve the dispute with
Bleazard, the water would not be provided immediately, but that there would be
irrigation water once that dispute was settled. R. 173. In addition, as the trial court aptly
noted, it is compelling that the Warrs9 own children, who were also promised water, did
not receive water rights in their warranty deeds, but instead were later given quit claim
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deeds to the irrigation water (those deeds were prepared at roughly the same time as the
deed

hr " V i - , iMi"i,|' •Il (

I

K ,u'"lvi ,it 145-146; R. 955 at

I'l.tmtills)

Under tiiwavvii cumstances, it is ticm llial llir piii'Mrs did rn I mlrmJ flic .si III.II ill
deeds to be a complete integration,, of their agreements. Accordingly, the parol evidence
rule does not apply, "lln trial court did not err in so concluding.
111
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The Warrs next assert, that the Plaintiffs" claims are barred by the Statute of
!:rauu.K which generally requires that an agreement conveying an interest in land be in
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Martin v, Sckoll, <>'/8 l\2d 274 (Utah 1983). In establishing this doctrine, courts
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First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; second, the
acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite;
and third, the acts must be done in reliance on the contract. Such acts in
reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been performed had the
contract not existed [in other words, they must be exclusively referable to
the contract] and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor
would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be
inadequate.
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983).
The foregoing standard is easily met in the instant case. The terms of the oral
agreement were clear and definite: in exchange for the Plaintiffs' payment of the
purchase price of the lots, the Defendants would deliver sufficient water to irrigate five
acres. Each Plaintiff paid the purchase price of his or her lot. Moreover, every Plaintiff,
as well as the Crittendens, testified that he or she would not have purchased a five-acre
lot without knowing where irrigation water would come from. R. 953 at 46, 62, 79, 103,
119, 184, 206; R. 954 at 14, 18, 30, 40, 56. As Heidi Thomas testified, "Gary was an old
farm boy, and he knew the importance of water with the property." R. 953 at 184.
In addition, in reliance on the oral agreement, each Plaintiff made valuable
improvements to the land. They built their homes on the lots, and Mel Spears, Fred
Martinez, and Wayne Reynolds expended considerable time, effort, and money on
installing a distribution pipeline so that the water could be delivered to their lots. The
Plaintiffs would not have done so absent an agreement giving them rights to the water.
Wayne Reynolds expressly stated that he would not have participated in installing the
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p I I le across six lots a he had not understood that he owned the water rights. R. 954 at
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Even assuming, however, thai (In; ll.nrifiilV „i is in triiaiitT on ilk" , nil agreaiii uf
.--i exclusively referable to the oral contract, the statute of frauds would still be
JUS case, In lioth\. Roth, tins Court stated:
[Wjhere the existence of the oral contract is established by the admission of
the party resisting specific performance or by competent evidence
independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts
of part performance be exclusively referable to the oral contract is satisfied.
MM V Jd 278 (Utah 1954) (emphasis added) Similarly, in Martin v. Scholl, the Court
stated1
[W]here the contract is admitted or [there are] strong independent acts
which prove the contract exists, the requirement of exclusively referable
acts has been relaxed , , , because the evidentiary concern is assuaged by
either the admission or the independent acts. Consequently, the more
conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less stringent the
requirement of exclusively referable acts,
678 P.2d ?,74 1 77 78 (\ HMII I <>811 i nnph.isis mldcd'
In this case, the trial court properly found that, in addition to the Plaintiffs' acts In
reliance on the agreement, there is independent evidence establishing the existence of the
id ii iilidib, MUI Iliiili iiiii'1 'tAtlusivcl) iderable ' icquirementis satisfied. The
Defendants' sworn affidavit in the 1CIKX Bleazard litigation admits Ihr v \ Ktnia niiln m m ,jl
contracts, stating: "We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rock}/ Top Subdivision
upon our representation that gravity flow Water would be provided to such lots from our
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interest in the Rose Spring" (Emphasis added). While the Warrs argue that the
foregoing sworn statement does not prove the existence of the oral contracts, Plaintiffs
submit that, at the very least, the affidavit provides strong independent evidence of the
contracts.
But the affidavit is not the only independent evidence the trial court found
probative of the oral contracts. The applications filed with the State Engineer's office
over a long period of time, signed and sworn to under oath by the Warrs, repeatedly
reference the Defendants' efforts to deliver the water from Rose Spring to the Rocky Top
Subdivision.9 The Warts' representations to the Planning Commission also indicate their
intent to develop the irrigation water in the Spring to be provided to lot purchasers.
Finally, Howard Warr's testimony established that the Warrs essentially admitted they
had originally agreed to provide the water as part of the purchase price of the lots, but

9

Taken together, the Warrs' 1988 affidavit and their applicationsfiledwith the State
Engineer's office miay well constitute a group of writings sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds. Under the statute offrauds,"[t]he writing [or group of writings] need not be made
as a memorandum of the contract,. . . nor must it be made contemporaneously with the
formation of the contract." Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wyo. 1990). In
Richardson, a property report filed with a government agency which acknowledged a verbal
agreement with another party was held to satisfy the statute of frauds. "When read in the
context of the report," the court reasoned, 'this statement reasonably identifies the parties,
the subject matter, amd their obligations to each other." Id. Likewise, the 1988 affidavit and
documents filed with the State Engineer identify the parties as the Warrs and the owners of
the lots, the subject matter as the water rights, and the Warrs' obligation to provide the
water. The statute of frauds simply does not preclude the enforcement of the Warrs' oral
agreement to provide the Water.
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f*.. • . i* was not important, since the Plaintiffs did not "have anything in writing,9' R. 953
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addition, the quit claim u^^Uo orepared bv tlie Wan& m i lamiui* in ~
themselves probative of the oral contracts, Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, If the W arcs
truly believed that (he\ had onl> promised to make the water available for purchase, whj 'r
w*i ill II linn, haw ii|iiiif i Ifiiiii ili/nls p r q v u r d ill lln Pliimtilh 1 iwiiics prim in even ofiLei

the waterforsale? The trial court did not err1 in determining that the evidence show
acts of part, performance and strong independent evidence of the oral contracts, such that
111 mi • s 111II ni ni 11 • i nil 11 a mi mi mi I i HI I i d n o t b a r p l a i n t i f f s " claims.
Moreover, the Warrs fa E

*ir burde-

«: Miaiing the

evidence on this point, and are therefore precluded from challenging this conclusion of
the trial court. U. R. App. ™ ^A/™ f'L * party challenging a fact finding must first
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marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding). See also Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008 (Utah 1989); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1987) ("To successfully appeal a trial court's finding of fact," the challenger must
"fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty ..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced which supports the very findings the appellant resists.") (emphasis
added).
A.

HAZEL WARR IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS UNDER
PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL.

In an apparent attempt to bolster their statute of frauds argument, the Warrs have
asserted that most of the Plaintiffs do not even allege that Hazel Warr promised to give
them the water, but claim only to have received an oral promise from Clayton Warr, and
then argue that the statute offraudswould nullify an otherwise enforceable promise by
Clayton Warr to convey water rights, because the promise was not expressly reiterated by
Hazel Warr. This argument is both factually and legally unfounded. First, the argument
is based on a clear misrepresentation of the trial testimony of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
have testified that Hazel Warr was involved in the promises and representations made to
them regarding water. R. 953 at 79-80,195-196; R. 954 at 6-9,27,45-46, 50. Lora
Lee Crittenden testified that Clayton and Hazel acted as "equal partners" in their dealings
with the Crittendens. R. 954 at 27.
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Even if the evidence did not show that Hazel Warr made promises to the Plaintiffs
regarding the irrigation water, the Warrs' argument would fail. Nothing in the cases
•e Warn in MI|V|PINI II( IIMMI nr^nnienl negates in viipasttles the applicability of
established principles of agency and estoppel,, both of which subject 1 Iii'/ei Win i h i
liability r

;

1.
Warr and Hi
Ih/d

-•

Clayton Warr and Howard Warr were agents of Hazel Warr
.

*

Clayton
an age ml for

'JII in coiMiection with sales of lots in the Subdivision. Authority to act -is ,in

agent for another can be created by "manifestations of consent of the principal lliat the
iigciii "i.linul.il ,11,1 mi in I until ul (he principal " ll'-i itatement of Agency (Second) § 7,
comment J ("our , ml < «iiii hv iiiaiiifcsleil In "wonk i ,nlli ,1* i, iiiinlin I, 111 11111111;>
acquiescence." Id. at comment c. Howard Warr's actions in selling lots, including
representations with regard to the water, were clearly known of and approved b) both his
parent1. K "'l):ij .ill I,J.I, i lazel, on more than one occasion, heard her husband promising
rights 1 HI " Wat"" In pnU:n!ml hi u i "

f«" 1 • \ '«( 7 4 . M i l , I J M % ' |/ 'Uivi

1 H'I-'MI ,"" , .I>I

46, 50. Hazel Warr, by her silence, mainlined consent to the actions of Clayton Warr
and 1 loward Warr with regard to sales of lots, Hazel Warr also testified that her husband
in Uil nil liii behalf in it1

11 liih, liPLi'iJiise she was occupied tending her

principles.
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In addition, by manifesting consent to potential buyers, Hazel Warr created
apparent authority for her husband and her son Howard to act on her behalf. "Apparent
authority results from a manifestation by a person that another is his agent, the
manifestation being made to a third person." Restatement of Agency (Second) § 8.
Hazel Warr was present on more than one occasion when Clayton Warr and/or Howard
Warr were discussing lots and water rights with potential buyers; by remaining silent, she
manifested her consent to their actions. Again, having known that the Plaintiffs believed
that Clayton and Howard were acting as her agents, and allowing them to act on that
belief, she is now bound by the actions taken by Clayton and Howard.
2.

Because of her actions, Hazel Warr is estoppedfrom arguing that she is
not bound by promises made to the Plaintiffs by Clayton Warr.

A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purported to be
done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability to persons who have
changed their positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into
by or for him, if
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts.
Restatement of Agency (Second) § 8B. A "change in position" is defined to include
payment of money and expenditure of labor. Id. A person is subject to liability if he or
she "remained silent with knowledge that another was purporting to contract on [her]
behalf." Id
In this case, the Plaintiffs "changed their positions because of their belief that the
[promise to convey water rights] was entered into by" Hazel Warr. See id. Assuming for
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the sake of argument that she never expressly promised to convey the water rights, she
nevertheless "intentionally or carelessly caused such belief by her silence regarding the
representations and promises made to Plaintiffs, of which she was clearly aware. The
trial court did not err in rejecting this argument by the Warrs. Moreover, again, the
Warrs failed to marshal the evidence on this point, and therefore have not raised an
adequate challenge to the finding. See, e.g., Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008
(Utah 1989); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,444 (Utah App. 1998).
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.

The Warrs also argue that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the four-year statute
of limitations for an action not founded on a written contract. See Utah Code Ann.§ 7812-25. However, the trial court correctly concluded otherwise. Under principles of
equitable estoppel, the Warrs are precluded by their own conduct from asserting the
statute of limitations as a defense. In addition, the Warrs failed to marshal the evidence
on this point as well as others, and have therefore not adequately challenged the trial
court's finding. See, e.g., Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008 (Utah 1989); Wilde v.
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1998).
1.

The Statute ofLimitations was Tolled by the Warrs9 Misleading Conduct

Utah courts have repeatedly held that a statute of limitations is tolled where the
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
misleading conduct, or where "the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
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application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Envirotech Corp.
v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah App. 1994). See also Warren v. Provo City, 838
P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981);
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978); Rice v. Granite School
Dist, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969)). The Plaintiffs submit that, under either of the
foregoing theories, the statute of limitations was tolled in this case.
This Court has stated: "[A] defendant who misleads a plaintiff or causes delay in
the bringing of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a
defense to the action." Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah 1994)
(internal citations omitted). Applied to the instant case, it is clear that the Warrs are
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense, due to their continual
misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs regarding the water. Specifically, after conveying the
deeds without the water rights, the Warrs continued to assure the Plaintiffs that the water
would be provided as soon as delivery became possible. For a number of years after the
Plaintiffs purchased their lots, the Warrs told them that the water could not yet be
delivered because of the pending litigation with Bleazard and various problems with the
pipeline. Thereafter, the Warrs represented that the deeds were being prepared.
Throughout this time, the Warrs acknowledged their obligation to provide and deliver the
water, and led the Plaintiffs to believe that they would do so as promised once the
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ownership of the Spring was adjudicated and the delivery system was in place.
Once the Bleazard litigation concluded, the Warrs clearly manifested an intention
to provide the water. They began working to solve problems connected with delivering
the water. The Plaintiffs assisted them in this effort, contributing both time and money to
the project. Several Plaintiffs joined together with the Warrs to purchase materials
needed, rented a backhoe, and physically worked together to install a pipeline. They did
so believing that their efforts would enable them to use the water to which they had
already purchased the rights. During this time, the Warrs never indicated to the Plaintiffs
that they did not intend to provide the water, or that the Plaintiffs would be charged an
additional fee for the water.
In late 1995, the Warrs first informed the Plaintiffs that quit claim deeds had been
prepared conveying the water rights as originally agreed. However, the Warrs now
stated, for the very first time, that the Plaintiffs would have to pay an additional $2,500
for the water rights, reasoning that they "had to make some money out of this." The
Plaintiffs were understandably outraged, given that they had already paid for the water
rights, and no prior mention of any additional charge for the water rights had ever been
made. When the Plaintiffs declined to pay the additional $2,500 for the quit claim deeds,
the Warrs refused to deliver the deeds. This was the first time in all their years of dealing
with the Plaintiffs that the Warrs expressly disavowed their obligations under their oral
agreements with the Plaintiffs. Until this event in late 1995, the Warrs led the Plaintiffs
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to believe that they would perform as agreed. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs1 Complaint was
filed well within the four-year statute. The trial court correctly determined that the
Plaintiffs acted with "reasonable dispatch once they determined that remedies were really
not going to [be] given to them as they had originally anticipated, and they did that
within a timely fashion." R. 955 at 148.
2.

The Statute ofLimitations was Tolled Under the Exceptional
Circumstances Exception.

Additionally,, the evidence also shows that the statute of limitations was tolled in
this case under the exceptional circumstances exception. Under that doctrine, the
plaintiff must make an initial showing that he or she did not know, and could not
reasonably have known, of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim
within the time prescribed by statute. The court then engages in the following balancing
test to determine whether the case presents exceptional circumstances: "Whether the
hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of
the case outweighs any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by
the passage of time." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992).
In this case, before late 1995, the Plaintiffs could not reasonably have known that
the Warrs would deny their contractual obligation to provide the water, given the Warrs1
repeated representations that they intended to deliver the water. Further, the application
of the balancing test set forth above clearly weighs in the Plaintiffs' favor. The trial court
expressly found that the Warrs were not prejudiced by the passage of time in this case.
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R. 955 at 150. By contrast, the hardship that the Plaintiffs will suffer if the statute of
limitations is applied to bar their claim is substantial-they will be permanently deprived
of valuable water rights for which they have paid, as well as the beneficial use of the
five-acre lots they now own.10 For this additional reason, the statute of limitations was
tolled. In short, due to the Warrs1 conduct, the statute of limitations cannot equitably be
raised as a valid defense to Plaintiffs' action. The trial court properly rejected this
defense.
V.

PLAINTIFFS WAYNE D. LEWIS AND MIRIAM LEWIS SUCCEEDED TO THE
CLAIMS OF HOWARD A. CRITTENDEN AND LORA LEE CRITTENDEN.

The Warrs have argued that Plantiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis are not entitled to
the irrigation water sold to the Crittendens, because they did not purchase their lot
directly from the Warrs, and they were informed by a realtor at the time of purchase that
they were receiving no water rights, but that they could purchase water rightsfromthe
Warrs for $2500. The facts relied on by the Defendants are irrelevant. The Lewises
received from the Crittendens and recorded a quit-claim deed conveying to the Lewises
all the Crittendens' interest in the water rights originally promised to and paid for by the

10

Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds would perhaps suffer the greatest hardship. Because of
a moratorium on well drilling, he has been unable to build a home on his lot, and because
he has no water, he cannot use his lot to grow any crops or raise game birds. Moreover, he
cannot even sell his lot, since there is simply not a market for five acre desert lots with
absolutely no water. Clearly, this case presents an exceptional circumstance, where the
application of the statute of limitations would be irrational and unjust.
47008W1

39

Crittendens. Trial Exh. 131. Accordingly, the claim for the water rights is now vested in
the Lewises, and they are entitled to the irrigation water.
VI.

THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE DEFENDANTS T O CONVEY AN
EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER.

The Warrs' final argument is that the Judgment entered by the trial court requires
them to convey an excessive amount of water. However, the only evidence in the record
supports the Judgment. The record plainly established that Plaintiffs were promised
sufficient water to irrigate five acres. The record also established that Plaintiffs (with the
exception of Wayne Reynolds) are able to irrigate one quarter of an acre with their
culinary wells. The Warrs' own expert witness, Mr. Vem Loveless, testified that using
the calculations employed by the State Engineer's office, .079 cfs would irrigate four and
three-quarter acres. R. 954 at 169-170, 182. Together with the Plaintiffs' rights to
appropriate .015 cfs from their culinary wells and to irrigate one quarter of an acre with
that water, the .079 cfs would give the Plaintiffs the amount of water the State Engineer's
office allocates for the irrigation of five acres. This was the amount used in the first quit
claim deeds in Plaintiffs' names (and in the names of the Warrs' children) prepared by
Mr. Loveless at Hazel Warr's instructions. Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88.
(Appellees' Supplemental Appendix at "A").
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these reasons, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the judgment in their favor be
affirmed
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I _ d a y of December, 2000.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

BV: Huu

\K?t^4^jJLj

Anthony L. Rampton
Marci Rechtenbach
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CONCLUSION
The evidence at trial and in the record clearly established that the Warrs entered
into oral contracts with the Plaintiffs (and in the Lewises' case, the Crittendens) to
provide the water as part of the purchase price of the lots. The Warrs themselves have
testified in prior litigation that they represented that irrigation water would be provided
with the lots they had sold. Notably, in that litigation, the Warrs' retaining the water
appeared to depend in part upon the existence of the agreements with the Plaintiffs and
other lot owners. The Warrs' present denial of their promises, together with their prior
sworn testimony in the Bleazard case, and their representations to the Planning
Commission and the State Engineer, make one fact abundantly clear: the Warrs will say
whatever they deem necessary to hold on to this irrigation water.
It is noteworthy that the Warrs did not initially deny the existence of the oral
contracts; they simply stated that the Plaintiffs didn't have "anything in writing." The
Warrs have engaged in a blatant and deliberate attempt to use the statute offraudsand
the statute of limitations to perpetuate a gross inequity, and these defenses should not be
upheld by this Court. Likewise, the defenses of lack of privity of contract, the parol
evidence rule, the doctrine of merger, and the laws ofjoint ownership do not provide a
valid basis for the Warrs to escape enforcement of the contracts they made with the
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are entitled to receive the water rights, the conveyance and
delivery of which are long overdue. The trial court did not err in so concluding. For
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J_(

day of December, 2000,1 caused to be mailed,
mailed.

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to
the following:
Denise A. Dragoo
Erik G. Davis
SNELL & WlLMER
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Addenda

Addendum 1

Recorded at Request of_
at

. M. Fee Paid $_

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref,:

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to MELVIN L. SPEARS AND SANDRA S.
SPEARS grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of
Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
STATE OF UTAH,
'lei**-.. tli*. i,M

County of Tooele

)

fi^cl^

^iSS^K^
***. ^.

On the^3of /jLr^ A D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and 4IAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.

My commission expires Address:

0/23fa

Notary Public.
sy/,
^ s >

/t%m0/&&*.

EXHIBIT
80

WAR000142

Addendum 2

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Pee Paid $

by

.
Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to WAYNE V. REYNOLDS grantee of Tooele
County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following described
water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the
of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
81

WAR000144

Addendum 3

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

by

.
Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to FREDDY MARTINEZ and KAREN
MARTINEZ grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of
Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

).

)
) ss.
)

On the
of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
82

WAR000152

Addendum 4

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

by

.
Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to GARY R. THOMAS grantee of Tooele
County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following described
water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7,9%) of Change Apphcation No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the
of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
83

WAR000143

Addendum 5

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CATHY N. WARR JOHNSON grantee of
Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following
described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
84

Addendum 6

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CECIL B. JONES and TERESA M. JONES
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
85

Addendum 7

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CLIFFORD R. RUBEN and TOUJAM
RUBEN grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of
Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change AppUcation No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) S3.

County of Tooele

)

On the
of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
86
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Addendum 8

Recorded at Request of
at

. M. Fee Paid $

.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:,

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to EDWARD K WARR and LISA G. WARR
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the
of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
87
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Addendum 9

Recorded at Request of
at

__. M. Fee Paid $

.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Page

Ref.:.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to HOWARD A. WARR and LINDA Z. WARR
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs.
Witness the hand of said grantors, this
Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Tooele

day of

, A. D. 1993

)

)
) ss.
)

On the of
, A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same.
Notary Public.
My commission expires Address:

EXHIBIT
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NFUCIS RESPONSE SHEET
To:

~Tohi*

/ Conflicts Coordinator

Date:

///tfg/flD

From: Conflict Coordinator / File Room
Notice Number:

Jff-/

//fatf/OFi

Client: <^}jft KJ

KllMJ^

The conflicts of interest computer check has been completed on the attached conflict email. Please note the following:
a

No conflicts were found

"a^Possible conflicts were found - See attached list

This engagement has been:
I d Accepted*
X \ J^ Determined no conflict exists, or
\ a Conflicts have been resolved
•

Rejected, but we have acquired enough information that we may not be able to
represent adverse parties. Retain these parties in the Conflicts database.

•

Rejected. No need to maintain information in Conflicts database.

•

Pending

* ATTENTION: Provide any additional related party names.

Attorney Signature / Date

PLEASE RETURN THE ATTACHED FORM
Note:
•
•

If rejected, return this form to Conflicts coordinator
If accepted, return originals to Conflicts coordinator and attach copy to
new engagement and send to Billing Specialist

Conflicts Checked
Conflict Response Sheet
Done

From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

Conflicts2 (tch) (Conflicts)
All Attorneys; All Paralegals; Conflicts2
Tue, Nov 28, 2000 11:40 AM
CONFLICT CHECK: INITIALS: TCH DATE: 11/28/00

•

Data Entered
Accepted, Declined, Pending
entered into Database

••"

CLIENT: JEFFREY KNOWLES
RELATED PARTY(IES):
PRIOR OR OTHER COUNSEL:
x/ / /
/
ADVERSE PARTY(IES): THE RANCHES L.C. V ^ / /
y/
ADVERSE RELATED PARTY(IES): SCOTT KIRKLAND and STAN RICKS
ADVERSE PARTY ADDRESS:
OPPOSING FIRM:
. OPPOSING ATTORNEY:
DESCRIPTION OF WORK: REPRESENT CLIENT IN ACTION TO FORECLOSE ON TRUST DEED
NOTE
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:
QUALIFIES FOR NEW BUSINESS CREDIT? (YES OR NO):

A//

Do NOT reply if you have no conflicts. If you DO have conflicts, please report them directly to the attorney
whose initials appear in the subject line above. Do NOT reply to conflicts.

CC:

All Secretaries

Conflicts Report
Notice Number
15847
Engagement Date 09/28/94
Prior/Other Counsel

Attorney
Completion Date
Archive Date
Opposing Firm
More Information to Follow

Opposing Attorney
Pending/Accepted
Comments

A

Work Description

File and pursue
purs motion to dismiss lawsuits as time barred.

JER

N

None known

Client
Adverse
Code

Related
Party
Code

Entity
Type SIC

First Name

Last Name

Scott

Kirkland

c

ind

99

Christy

Kirkland

c

ind

99

George

Hermestroff

a

ind

99

Helen

Hermestroff

a

ind

99

Evelyne

Broitman

a

ind

99

Printed: 11/28/00

Page

1

Conflicts Report
Notice Number
100134
Engagement Date 10/13/92
Prior/Other Counsel
Opposing Attorney
Pending/Accepted a
Comments
Work Description

Attorney
Completion Date
Archive Date
Opposing Firm
More Information to Follow

rlh

collection

Last Name

Client
Adverse
Code

Related
Party
Code

Entity
Type SIC

Holliday Affaire

unk

c

cor

99

Stan

Ricks

off

crp

ind

99

John

Jesperson

off

crp

ind

First Name

Printed: 11/28/00
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